
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 2019
Pages: 161-170
Series: Contributions to Phenomenology
ISBN (Hardback): 9783030307882
Full citation:
, "Self-feeling and unity", in: Self-feeling, Berlin, Springer, 2019
Abstract
This chapter shows that self-feeling may contribute to the problem of unity as well, while not attempting to present a comprehensive theory of self. This can be further explained by introducing Heidegger's notion of the "care-structure". It has three elements that are affectively manifested and revealed in self-feeling. Importantly, Heidegger's "care-structure" is not static but essentially temporal. Thus, self-feeling is not about ourselves as static sameness but as dynamic, living beings. It affectively discloses and manifests the basic, dynamic structure of "care". There is no "core self" that would be the object of self-feeling. Instead, self-feeling is the affective resonance to our active way of existing as human beings. As can be seen, this account of self-feeling goes beyond the egological/non-egological distinction. It is not non-egological because it reveals our individual existence as a whole. It is not egological in the traditional sense because it is not about a "core self". Instead, it is egological in a new, unorthodox way because it is the affective resonance of the dynamic process of our individual, human life. As a consequence, self-feeling can account for the unity of self-consciousness both in its synchronic and its diachronic aspect.
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 2019
Pages: 161-170
Series: Contributions to Phenomenology
ISBN (Hardback): 9783030307882
Full citation:
, "Self-feeling and unity", in: Self-feeling, Berlin, Springer, 2019