On the development of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

Julia Jansen

pp. 121-132

in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 4 (2), 2005.

Abstract

In this paper I trace Husserl's transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund