The baroque formulation of consciousness in the domain of phenomenological clarification

pp. 235-256

in: Frederick Kersten, Galileo and the "invention" of opera, Berlin, Springer, 1997

Abstract

Both the Classical and Baroque formulations of consciousness, as well as their criticism in the eighteenth century, presuppose and take for granted, the fourfold, ungrounded ontic conviction of daily life as positing the "metaphysically real," the indicational appresentation of which is extrapolated from ordinary, common-sensical experience founded on the ungrounded ontic conviction (in Husserl's lingo, the general positing of the "natural attitude"). As long as the presupposition is in full force, the result of these formulations entails the distinction between the non-simply connected space of the gap rather than the "simply" connected space of daily life. Their confusion, or the attempt to substitute the former for the latter, lead to death, madness, prison.