Intentionality and constitution

changes in the concept of intentionality in edmund Husserl's philosophy

pp. 83-105

in: Elisabeth Ströker, The Husserlian foundations of science, Berlin, Springer, 1997

Abstract

The focal point of this chapter is the transition from the static structural analysis of consciousness to genetic constitutive analysis, which is of great importance for Husserl's deepened conception of intentionality. This change is due to Husserl's realization that the constitution of objectivity is not achieved in single, distinct acts but in a temporal genesis in which active constitutions in the past as well as passive pre-constitutions are involved. To disclose these sediments Husserl developed his phenomenological analysis of intentional acts into what he called "intentional analysis." This kind of analysis also led to a new thematization of the "I." From that point on the "I" was no longer conceived as a mere source of acts but emerged as a field of self-experience, so that by means of its sense-constituting achievements it gains its own characteristics, thus revealing itself as a concrete ego.