LU V

names refer back to judgments and judgments refer back to names. the problem of synthesis

pp. 109-124

in: Jay Lampert, Synthesis and backward reference in Husserl's Logical investigations, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

My interest in LU v focuses on Husserl's descriptive category of "referring backward". Husserl says that names refer back to judgments, but he also says that judgments refer back to names, and in the course of this analysis, he says a number of important things about the nature of backward reference generally and about the status of those parts of an act of consciousness which exist only as the targets of backward reference. In chapters 1–4, we have considered other issues on which Husserl describes a mutual priority of two correlative terms, namely the mutual priorities of occasional and objective expressions, of universal and particular objects, of parts and wholes, and of syncategorematic and categorematic terms. In LU v, the relative priority in question is that between names and judgments, but Husserl's claims are general enough to allow us to speak of backward reference as such and the problem of the "implicit".