Critique et système de la métaphysique dans la dernière philosophie de Schelling

Jean-François Courtine

pp. 161-175

in: Paul Sars, Chris Bremmers, Koen Boey (eds), Eros and Eris, Berlin, Springer, 1992

Abstract

To Schelling philosophy as a system is at first the auto-manifestation of the absolute, i.e., the auto-affirmation of absolute reason. From 1809 onwards this conception comes to a crisis. In his teaching in Munich, Schelling criticizes Hegel's philosophy which is in essence an ontotheology. This article shows how Schelling transcends ontotheology, by contrasting his positive philosophy of revelation with the Hegelian concept of the manifestation of the absolute. It appears that the auto-manifestation which dominates the Hegelian perspective, threatens to abolish finitude and exteriority. Schelling on the contrary conceives revelation from the perspective of finite subjectivity and as presupposing exteriority. The One who reveals Himself, does not do so necessarily and addresses Himself to free man. In his critique of Hegel's ontotheology Schelling gives way to Heidegger's Überkommniss as well as to an approach to temporality which invites the admission of a "second science'. This science concerns itself with that which transcends reason and which is, as the Unvordenkliche, the object of reason's extasy.

Cited authors

Heidegger Martin

Schelling Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph