Human agency and the social sciences
from contextual phenomenology to genealogy
pp. 187-194
in: Babette Babich (ed), Hermeneutic philosophy of science, van Gogh's eyes, and God, Berlin, Springer, 2002Abstract
Husserl established the standard phenomenological approach to the social sciences with his claim that transcendental phenomenology determines the universal a priori and fundamental grounds for all objective descriptions and claims. Such a position, however, appears to leave phenomenology open to the charge that it presupposes some kind of disinterested observer, who offers non-contextual, value-free descriptions of our cognitive structure, motives, values, social practices. It could be objected that this, in turn, prevents Husserlian phenomenology from properly taking account of the socio-historical conditions under which human action occurs and of the explanation of such actions offered by the social sciences.
