Rights in Green's political theory
universal or historical?
pp. 129-147
in: , T. H. Green's moral and political philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2001Abstract
The theory of rights is presented in Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (hereafter, Principles).2 Green expresses strong disagreement with the concept of "natural' rights (defended by Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau)3 and he also rejects the idea that we have rights as a result of "consent'. He claims that the "doctrine that the rights of government are founded on the consent of the governed is a confused way of stating the truth that the institutions by which man is moralised … express a conception of a common good'.4 Green argues that we are entitled to rights because this enables us to fulfil our moral agency, and thus, to contribute to the common good. The purpose of rights should not be seen as a protection of the individual from social authorities, because "a right against society, as such, is an impossibility'.5 Rights should be exercised for the purpose of creating an ever better community where individuals contribute to the common good and treat each other as equals, on a voluntary basis. The concept of "natural' rights has developed as a result of the philosophical failure to see that we have rights only as members of a society where the social practice of mutual respect has already taken place.