Abstract
In Chap. 9, we saw that we imagine that we have ideas of objects that admit of perfect identity only after we have rejected vulgar perspective II. Hume repeats this claim in 1.4.6—at least in part. This occurs during his admittedly "labyrinth[ine]" (T App. 10; SBN 633) explanation of how we imagine the notion of the self, an explanation that he famously attacks just 2 years after the publication of the Treatise in the Appendix (T App. 10–22; SBN 633–6). Here, I show that it is very likely that this attack comprises Hume's acknowledgement of the rift between the transcendental account of perfect identity and the philosopher's account of perfect identity. In the Appendix, Hume suggests that the philosophical account of perfect identity is mistaken, while his account of transcendentally conceived of perfect identity is correct—at least in regard to the "self." However, this is not a definitive solution to the conflict. In fact, this conflict is never resolved in the Treatise, nor elsewhere.