Kantian radical evil and Sartrean bad faith
pp. 158-175
in: Sorin Baiasu (ed), Comparing Kant and Sartre, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
There is a particular problem in Kant's doctrine of evil, one which has the potential seriously to impact upon both his account of rational agency and his moral philosophy. In this chapter, I would like to offer a solution to this problem. Briefly stated, the issue arises because of the following considerations: Kant believes that our actions are guided by the maxims we have endorsed and that we are ultimately guided in our choice of these maxims by a freely chosen supreme maxim. This can only be good or evil1 and constitutes a person's overall moral disposition. The difficulty for the doctrine of evil is that as free and rational beings, we have overriding reason to choose the moral supreme maxim because it (and only it) allows us to affirm both our rationality and our full freedom (autonomy). This makes it mysterious how any will could bring itself to choose the opposite: the evil supreme maxim.
