Causation and mental content
against the externalist reading of Ockham
pp. 59-80
in: Jenny Pelletier, Magali Roques (eds), The language of thought in late medieval philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2017Abstract
On the dominant interpretation, Ockham is an externalist about mental content. This reading is founded principally on his theory of intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition plays a foundational role in Ockham's account of concept formation and judgment, and Ockham insists that the content of intuitive states is determined by the causal relations such states bear to their objects. The aim of this chapter is to challenge the externalist interpretation by situating Ockham's account of intuitive cognition vis-à-vis his broader account of efficient causation. While there can be no doubt that intuitive states are causally individuated, I argue that, given Ockham's broader theory of efficient causation, this very fact entails that the content of such states is determined by factors internal (rather than external) to the states themselves.