Is there a metaphysical approach to the transcendentals in Ockham?
the case of the good
pp. 111-124
in: Jenny Pelletier, Magali Roques (eds), The language of thought in late medieval philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2017Abstract
The transcendentals (being, one, good, true, thing, and something) have long been associated with medieval philosophy and metaphysics in particular. Scholarship has accepted that Ockham's treatment of the transcendentals is markedly semantic: the transcendentals are primarily conceived as terms or concepts rather than as features of reality. This chapter argues that despite the legitimacy of characterizing Ockham's doctrine of the transcendentals as semantic, there is (and ought to be) a metaphysical basis to this doctine for at least the case of the good. Being good is an intrinsic and necessary feature of every being. How this metaphysical claim is to be understood is an important addition to Ockham's discussion on the semantic properties of the terms "being" and "good."
