Castañeda's theory of deontic meaning and truth
pp. 273-289
in: Hector-Neri Castañeda, Berlin, Springer, 1986Abstract
Twentieth-century metaethics has been for some time an arena for combat between established theories that neatly fit into one of a few categories: emotivism, prescriptivism, naturalism, and intuitionism. Hector-Neri CastaŇeda"s analysis of deontic language, however, cuts across these categories and incorporates doctrines from each opposing camp. To come to terms with his analysis, we must identify the legitimate insights of each camp and determine whether he has done justice to them. I conclude that he is largely successful, though I criticize the radical distinction he makes between the meaning and truth conditions of deontic judgments. He believes that making such a radical distinction enables him to reconcile the insights behind naturalism and intuitionism, but he actually loses explanatory power with this move. I will propose an alternative analysis that brings the meaning and truth conditions closer together. I conclude more generally that CastaŇeda"s work demonstrates the need to redraw the theoretical map of metaethics, that the most fruitful work in the future will cut across the old categories as his work does.
