The presuppositioned priority of the being-question

pp. 111-133

in: John Deely, The tradition via Heidegger, Berlin, Springer, 1971

Abstract

For the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, that which must be brought into the Open, "ever since the philosophical awakening with Brentano, is the Being of beings in its difference from beings,"¹ and indeed in its difference from what may be said about beings precisely as such. Once he felt he had the powerful probe of Phenomenology well under his mastery, he at last felt himself in a position to bring the pressure of reflection to bear on this question in such a way as to force the elusive determination to reveal itself, to become visible, to enter into the Open. Sein und Zeit opened the inquiry into the "disclosure of Being," which means as we have seen "the unlocking of what forgetfulness of Being," i.e., the traditional interpretation of the Being-question as the question of beings (res existentes) as such, "closes and hides."²