What makes a classical concept classical?
pp. 201-229
in: Jan Faye, Henry J. Folse (eds), Niels Bohr and contemporary philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1994Abstract
There was a time, not so very long ago, when Niels Bohr's influence and stature as a philosopher of physics rivaled his standing as a physicist. But now there are signs of a growing despair — much in evidence during the 1985 Bohr centennial — about our ever being able to make good sense out of his philosophical views.3 I would not beg the question of whether or not Bohr's philosophy of physics can be given a coherent interpretation, but I think that the despair is premature. What has come unraveled is the illusion of understanding given to us by Bohr's self-appointed spokespeople in various philosophical camps — the logical positivists are chiefly to blame — who sought vindication for their own views more than an accurate reading of Bohr's. And this does not imply that understanding is impossible. What is needed at the present juncture is really quite simple. We need to return to Bohr's own words, filtered through no preconceived philosophical dogmas. We need to apply the critical tools of the historian in order to establish what those words were and how they changed over time. We need to assume, at least provisionally, that Bohr's words make sense. And we need to apply the synthetic tools of the philosopher in order to reconstruct from Bohr's words a coherent philosophy of physics. The present paper is intended as a contribution to these efforts.
