The two-dimensional view of the history of chemistry

Alexander A. Pechenkin

pp. 369-377

in: Kostas Gavroglu, Jean Christianidis, Efthymios Nicolaidis (eds), Trends in the historiography of science, Berlin, Springer, 1994

Abstract

As far as this article is concerned with the metaphor of the dimensions of the history of science, it needs some comments on G. Holton's discussion of the two-dimensional view of science.¹ G. Holton calls the standard philosophical view of science which has its roots in empirism or positivism a two-dimensional view. To explain that view he uses a mnemonic device of two orthogonal axes representing the two dimensions of a plane. These dimensions are phenomenal and analytic. A scientific statement, in the 'standard" view, is analogous to an element of area in the plane, and the projection of it onto axes are the aspects of the statement that can be rendered, respectively, as the phenomenal aspect (protocol of observation) and the analytic one (protocol of calculation). In other words, any scientific statement has "meaning" only so far as it can be shown to have phenomenal and/or analytic components in the plane.