The ontology of explanation

David-Hillel Rúben

pp. 67-85

in: Fred D'agostino, I. C. Jarvie (eds), Freedom and rationality, Berlin, Springer, 1989

Abstract

John Watkins and I seem to be equally out of fashion in our shared views on explanation. There is no shame in this, since fashions change but the truth is forever. I, like him, cannot make such sense of the idea of probabilistic or statistical explanation. I do not share his rejection of inductive argument per se, but since I agree with him that "the occurrence at a particular time of a chance event simply defies all explanation",¹ I hold that no such non-deductive argument whose conclusion mentions a particular event could count as an explanation of that particular event, however highly probable, given the premises, that conclusion is.

Cited authors

Watkins John