Justice and justification in the new rhetoric

Ray D. Dearin

pp. 155-185

in: James L. Golden, Joseph J. Pilotta (eds), Practical reasoning in human affairs, Berlin, Springer, 1986

Abstract

In 1940 Albert Einstein passed along, sadly perhaps, but with a note of resignation, one of the cardinal tenets of the wisdom received from rationalism and positivism. He expressed the futility of arguing about ultimate values. "I know that it is a hopeless undertaking to debate about fundamental value judgments," he wrote. "For instance, if someone approves, as a goal, the extirpation of the human race from the earth, one cannot refute such a viewpoint on rational grounds. But if there is agreement on certain goals and values, one can argue rationally about the means by which these objectives may be attained."1 As a theoretical physicist who devoted his considerable powers of conceptualization almost exclusively to the achievement of a deeper insight into the nature of physical reality, Einstein would have modestly disclaimed any special knowledge of logic, epistemology, or of the scope and limitations of rational thought. The notion that basic values were impregnable to logical assault was accepted so pervasively, however, as to raise no eyebrows among the professional philosophers whose training had equipped them to issue pronouncements upon such ideas.

Cited authors

Einstein Albert