On the social side of self-knowledge

pp. 148-160

in: Jesse Butler, Rethinking introspection, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013

Abstract

Philosophical conceptions of introspection and self-knowledge typically emphasize first-person access to one's own mind, an orientation which we have analyzed in various ways throughout this book. More recent philosophical and scientific work emphasizes third-person objectivity which I have also brought into the mix to provide a more accurate and well-rounded understanding of introspection, as well as to mitigate some of the over-inflated epistemic privilege that has been granted to the first-person perspective, especially in Cartesian approaches to the mind. However, self-knowledge involves second-person interpersonal processes as well, through social interactions in which epistemic agents learn about themselves from others. The second-person stance is often not considered in philosophical and scientific work on the mind, though some have made efforts to give it more attention (e.g., Thompson, 2001; Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 152–185). This chapter establishes a framework for bringing second-person social interaction into our understanding of introspection and self-knowledge. In particular, I will look at how substantial components of self-knowledge are acquired through social navigation and interpersonal testimony, via an agent's ability to navigate her position in social environments through what others say to her.