The value of instrumental reason

"science as a vocation"

pp. 45-63

in: Nicholas Gane, Max Weber and postmodern theory, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002

Abstract

The rationalization and disenchantment of the world, as outlined in the previous two chapters, is accompanied by the rise of new instrumentally rational forms of this-worldly legitimation (for example, monocratic bureaucracy), and by the differentiation and de-differentiation of modern culture, manifested in the emergence and rationalization of autonomous and conflicting life-orders. The outcome of this movement, is a form of cultural nihilism, for with the rationalization of the world ultimate values are progressively disenchanted by the claims of "rational" science, or even devalue and disenchant themselves through a process of self-rationalization that is spurred by the (unintended) cultivation of new forms of instrumental reason. In view of this, the present chapter analyses Weber's position on science, and questions the value of this enterprise given, first, its role in disenchanting the world, and second, its apparent inability to fill the void left by the death of God. This chapter will focus on the lecture "Science as a Vocation", Weber's most explicit statement on science, and will pay particular attention to its allusions to the work of Tolstoy and Nietzsche. It will be argued that Weber, in forging a position against that of Tolstoy (the rejection of this world) and Nietzsche (the revaluation of all values), offers us a guide to how we may employ instrumental reason while remaining sensitive to the further rationalization and disenchantment of the world.