Particularism and methodism

pp. 107-128

in: Steven Bland, Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018

Abstract

This chapter surveys three responses the problem of the criterion: particularists claim that beliefs can be justified without our knowing that their sources are trustworthy; methodists claim that methods can be trustworthy without our knowing that they reliably yield true beliefs; and beliefs and methods can be jointly justified by showing that they can accommodate one another in a reflective equilibrium. Each of these responses amounts to begging the question in response to the Agrippan argument, but this need not disqualify them from being effective responses to scepticism. However, the fact that these strategies also involve begging the question when used to justify an epistemic system does disqualify them from being effective responses to epistemic relativism.