Lakatos, reason and history

Gabor Forrai

pp. 73-83

in: George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, Michael Stöltzner (eds), Appraising Lakatos, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

Lakatos' philosophy of science is puzzling and can be interpreted in widely varying ways. According to the most widespread interpretation, his aim was to reconcile a basically Popperian outlook with the historical facts discovered by Kuhn and Feyerabend.² The purpose of this paper is to use his work to critically assess the project of which, according to this interpretation, he was an outstanding representative. This project conceives the task of philosophy of science as showing the value of science by developing a normative theory of science, a methodology. Its chief representatives were the logical positivists and Popper. Currently, Larry Laudan is the leading representative of this approach. The turn of the century conventionalists Poincaré and Duhem do not belong here: they were interested in the epistemological status of scientific theories, rather than in laying down universal norms for scientific practice.³ It is for the same reason that later-day scientific realists like Richard Boyd or William Newton-Smith do not fit in here either. Their project is very much like that of the conventionalists, even though they reach practically the opposite conclusions. Kuhn and the other historically-minded authors also stand apart, for their approach is emphatically descriptive, not normative: they wish to study what happens in science rather than what should happen.

Cited authors

Popper Karl

Laudan Larry