Accounts of justice in the Scottish enlightenment

Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini

pp. 177-189

in: Guttorm Fløistad (ed), Philosophy of justice, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstract

In this chapter, I will focus on the concept of justice as it emerges during the Scottish Enlightenment in the moral, social and political theories developed by the Scottish philosophers David Hume, Adam Smith, Lord Kames, and Thomas Reid. The Scottish philosophers dealt with justice as a characteristic of the individual and, paradoxically, they explained that concept as an institutionalized practice. Central to their theories was the question whether this virtue is an inherent part of human nature or whether it is artificial. In particular, I will focus on Hume's account of justice and his main claim that it is an artificial virtue and the product of human conventions, as well as on his view that justice lies in its utility in maintaining property as a condition of a stable society, which was criticized by other notable Scottish philosophers such as Lord Kames and Thomas Reid. Reid in particular, in his criticism of Hume's theory of justice, develops a rights-based theory arguing that justice's utility is insufficient to distinguish it from natural virtues such as benevolence, while Adam Smith, in his criticism of Hume's view that justice depends on utility, coupled justice with beneficence since the two virtues are directly concerned with our relationship to other people. In their theories, the Scottish philosophers were concerned with the moral virtues and jurisprudence as well as with the moral dimensions of modernization and economic improvement of their commercial or civil society and they valued justice, law, rights, and obligations since they envisaged a stable society and government in order to secure the future.

Cited authors

Hume David

Smith Adam

Reid Thomas