
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 1976
Pages: 116-131
Series: Synthese Library
ISBN (Hardback): 9789027706300
Full citation:
, "The duhemian argument", in: Can theories be refuted?, Berlin, Springer, 1976


The duhemian argument
pp. 116-131
in: Sandra Harding (ed), Can theories be refuted?, Berlin, Springer, 1976Abstract
No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypotheses H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an explanans of any emprical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction with which H functions as an explanans. For Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case.
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 1976
Pages: 116-131
Series: Synthese Library
ISBN (Hardback): 9789027706300
Full citation:
, "The duhemian argument", in: Can theories be refuted?, Berlin, Springer, 1976