An analytic phenomenology

Husserl's path to the things themselves

Jean-Daniel Thumser

pp. 3-15

in: Iulian Apostolescu (ed), The subject(s) of phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2020

Abstract

In contrast to the scientific and mundane understanding of things, Husserl introduced the phenomenological reduction in order to comprehend things themselves. As the transcendental subject redirects his sight to apprehend things in a non-thetic way, things which were first perceived simpliciter are now perceived idealiter because they are reachable for the conscious subject. However, the practice of the reduction rejects any use of a thetic mundane aspect. Then how is it possible to talk about inner or reduced experiences when the language itself is mundane? It is our task to understand how a transcendental language may be possible by determining the different steps of Husserl's conception of language from the Logical Investigations to his later manuscripts. We will see that the path to the things themselves is more perilous than we think.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund