Is truth a normative concept?

Paul Horwich

pp. 1127-1138

in: Joseph Ulatowski, Cory Wright (eds), Minimalism about truth, Synthese 195 (3), 2018.

Abstract

My answer will be ‘no’. And I’ll defend it by: (i) distinguishing a concept’s having normative import from its being functionally normative; (ii) sketching a method for telling whether or not a concept is of the latter sort; (iii) responding to the antideflationist, Dummettian argument (extended in different directions by Crispin Wright, Huw Price, and Michael Lynch) in favor of the conclusion that truth is functionally normative; (iv) proceeding to address a less familiar route to that conclusion—one that’s consistent with deflationism about truth, but that depends on the further assumption that meaning is intrinsically normative; and (v) arguing that this further assumption is mistaken.

Cited authors

Lynch Michael

Wright Crispin

Price Huw