Objectivity without objects

a priorian program

James Van Cleve

pp. 3535-3549

in: Jørgen Albretsen, Per V. Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm (eds), The logic and philosophy of A. N. Prior, Synthese 193 (11), 2016.

Abstract

The issues I explore in this paper are best introduced by the table with which it begins. The left-hand entry in each row gives expression to a kind objectivity; the right-hand entry affirms the existence of a special kind of object. When philosophers believe in any of the entities on the right, it is typically because they think them necessary to ground the facts on the left. By the same token, when philosophers deny any of the facts on the left, it is often because they cannot bring themselves to believe in the associated kind of object on the right. My project is to explore the extent to which it is possible to have the objectivity without the objects—for example, absolute motion without substantival space, objective predication without universals, objective synonymy without propositions, and objective modality without possible worlds. Each of these combinations would have been congenial to A.N. Prior.

Cited authors

Prior Arthur N