Singular terms revisited

Robert Schwartzkopff

pp. 909-936

in: Thomas Ågotnes, Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek (eds), Logic and the foundations of game and decision theory, Synthese 193 (3), 2016.

Abstract

Neo-Fregeans take their argument for arithmetical realism to depend on the availability of certain, so-called broadly syntactic tests for whether a given expression functions as a singular term. The broadly syntactic tests proposed in the neo-Fregean tradition are the so-called inferential test and the Aristotelian test. If these tests are to subserve the neo-Fregean argument, they must be at least adequate, in the sense of correctly classifying paradigm cases of singular terms and non-singular terms. In this paper, I pursue two main goals. On the one hand, I show that the tests’ current state-of-the-art formulations are inadequate and, hence, cannot subserve the neo-Fregean argument. On the other hand, I propose revisions that are adequate and, hence, can subserve this argument.

Cited authors

Frege Gottlob

Aristoteles