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Publication details

Year: 2015

Pages: 2747-2768

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Thomas Grundmann, "How reliabilism saves the apriori/aposteriori distinction", Synthese 192 (9), 2015, pp. 2747-2768.

Abstract

Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. While for the evidentialist, experience is epistemically relevant only if it is used as evidence, the reliabilist requires that the reliability of the relevant process depends on the reliability of experiential processes. I will argue that the reliabilist account accommodates our pre-theoretic classifications much better. In the final part of my paper I will use the reliabilist criterion to defend the a priori—a posteriori distinction against recent challenges by Hawthorne and Williamson.

Publication details

Year: 2015

Pages: 2747-2768

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Thomas Grundmann, "How reliabilism saves the apriori/aposteriori distinction", Synthese 192 (9), 2015, pp. 2747-2768.