A mechanistic framework for Darwinism or why Fodor's objection fails

Fermín Fulda

pp. 163-183

in: Synthese 192 (1), 2015.

Abstract

Fodor (Mind Lang 23:1–24, Mind Lang 2008a, 23:50–57, 2008b and Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (What Darwin go wrong, Picador, New York, 2011) argue that Darwinism cannot be true on the grounds that there are no laws of selection to support counterfactuals about why traits are selected-for. Darwinian explanations, according to this objection, amount to mere ‘plausible historical narratives’. I argue that the objection is predicated on two problematic assumptions: A nomic-subsumption account of causation and causal explanation, and a fine-grained view of the individuation of selected-for effects. Against the former, I argue that Darwinian explanations are a historical species of mechanistic explanation and that mechanisms are causally productive and counterfactual supporting in the absence of appropriate laws. Once this mechanistic framework is in place, the demand for laws of selection vanishes and the historical cum causal coherence of Darwinism is restored. As for the second assumption, I argue that it is an artefact of the teleosemantic program with no basis in evolutionary biology and that properly understood, Darwinian evolutionary biology shows just why teleosemantics cannot succeed.

Cited authors

Darwin Charles

Fodor Jerry