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Publication details

Year: 2013

Pages: 3929-3952

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Anne Baril, "Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence", Synthese 190 (17), 2013, pp. 3929-3952.

Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence

Anne Baril

pp. 3929-3952

in: Synthese 190 (17), 2013.

Abstract

Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p (Fantl and McGrath, Phil Phenomenol Res LXXV(3):558–589 , 2007). In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, 2007), Bishop and Trout (Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment, 2005), and Baehr (The inquiring mind, 2011). I believe that practical considerations bear on whether a disposition is an epistemic excellence, and I propose a practical condition on epistemic excellence that is roughly analogous to the practical condition on knowledge proposed by Fantl and McGrath. Since the view is also an epistemic analogue to a kind of moral rationalism in ethics, we might also call it a variety of ‘epistemic rationalism’.

Publication details

Year: 2013

Pages: 3929-3952

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Anne Baril, "Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence", Synthese 190 (17), 2013, pp. 3929-3952.