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Publication details

Year: 2007

Pages: 35-64

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Michael Levin, "Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein", Synthese 155 (1), 2007, pp. 35-64.

Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein

Michael Levin

pp. 35-64

in: Synthese 155 (1), 2007.

Abstract

It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.”

Cited authors

Publication details

Year: 2007

Pages: 35-64

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Michael Levin, "Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein", Synthese 155 (1), 2007, pp. 35-64.