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Publication details
Year: 1988
Pages: 245-261
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "The calculus of dissent", Synthese 76 (2), 1988, pp. 245-261.
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The calculus of dissent
an analysis of terrorists' choice of targets
pp. 245-261
in: Synthese 76 (2), 1988.Abstract
This article applies formal modeling to study a terrorist group's choice of whether to attack or not, and, in the case of an attack, which of two potential targets to strike. Each potential target individually takes protective measures that influence the terrorists' perceived success and failure, and, hence, the likelihood of attack. For domestic terrorism, a tendency for potential targets to overdeter is indicated. For transnational terrorism, cases of overdeterrence and underdeterrence are identified. We demonstrate that increased information about terrorists' preferences, acquired by the targets, may exacerbate inefficiency when deterrence efforts are not coordinated. In some cases, perfect information may eliminate the existence of a noncooperative solution.
Publication details
Year: 1988
Pages: 245-261
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "The calculus of dissent", Synthese 76 (2), 1988, pp. 245-261.