More on "the philosophical significance of Gödel's theorem"

A. W. Moore

pp. 103-126

in: New essays on the philosophy of Michael Dummett, Grazer Philosophische Studien 55, 1998.

Abstract

In Michael Dummett's celebrated essay on Gödel's theorem he considers the threat posed by the theorem to the idea that meaning is use and argues that this threat can be annulled. In my essay I try to show that the threat is even less serious than Dummett makes it out to be. Dummett argues, in effect, that Gödel's theorem does not prevent us from "capturing" the truths of arithmetic; I argue that the idea that meaning is use does not require that we be able to "capture" these truths anyway. Towards the end of my essay I relate what I have been arguing first to Dummett's concept of indefinite extensibility and then to some of Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel's theorem.

Cited authors

Dummett Michael

Gödel Kurt