Kant's and Husserl's agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology

Julia Jansen

pp. 161-172

in: Dermot Moran, Marta Jorba (eds), Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology, Philosophical Explorations 19 (2), 2016.

Abstract

In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience (Erlebnis) and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. These, I believe, augment contemporary discussions in interesting ways and further bolster the case for cognitive phenomenology. Moreover, the historical comparison highlights a number of assumptions made today that were not yet part of the framework at the time of Kant or at the time of Husserl. This helps reflect on the legitimacy of these assumptions.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Kant Immanuel