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Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2013

Pages: 485-499

Series: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences

Full citation:

John Tienson, "Kasimir Twardowski on the content of presentations", Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 12 (3), 2013, pp. 485-499.

Abstract

In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of "naturalizing" the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which a presentation of an object presents a certain object and no other. In the cases in which an object is presented as simple, there is nothing more that can be said about the relation of content and object. It is sui generis: the relation of content to an object by virtue of which it presents that object. Further, the content of a presentation is never itself directly presented. The content can only be gotten at indirectly, as the content by which such and such object is presented. Where the presented object is complex—as is of course the normal case—a lot that is useful can be said about the structure of the content. In this paper, I lay out Twardowski's theory of the content of presentations. Since the business of content is to present its object, I briefly present the basics of Twardowski's mereology of objects.

Cited authors

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2013

Pages: 485-499

Series: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences

Full citation:

John Tienson, "Kasimir Twardowski on the content of presentations", Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 12 (3), 2013, pp. 485-499.