Body-extension versus body-incorporation

is there a need for a body-model?

Helena De Preester

Manos Tsakiris

pp. 307-319

in: Dorothée Legrand, Thor Grünbaum, Joel Krueger (eds), Dimensions of bodily subjectivity, Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 8 (3), 2009.

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of a pre-existing body-model that is an enabling constraint for the incorporation of objects into the body. This body-model is also a basis for the distinction between body extensions (e.g., in the case of tool-use) and incorporation (e.g., in the case of successful prosthesis use). It is argued that, in the case of incorporation, changes in the sense of body-ownership involve a reorganization of the body-model, whereas extension of the body with tools does not involve changes in the sense of body-ownership.