Reflexive monism versus complementarism

an analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of max Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness

Hans-Ulrich Hoche

pp. 389-409

in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 6 (3), 2007.

Abstract

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic "phenomenon' in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans's reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans's ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund