Natanson on phenomenology in psychiatry

Osborne P. Wiggins

pp. 31-41

in: Steven Crowell (ed), The prism of the self, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

This essay arises out of reflections on Maurice Natanson's rich article, "Philosophy and Psychiatry."¹ To some extent I have tried simply to interpret Natanson, but I have also taken the liberty of adding to and diverging from what he has written. Natanson's work, in its multifaceted implications, actually invites such liberty on the reader's part. But the reader, in taking this liberty, thereby incurs a duty always to respect the work. Hence if I have made claims that Natanson has not, it is only in an attempt to think through his claims. I have here purposefully chosen the phrase "thinking through his claims." It is like a person with seriously defective eyesight being given the opportunity to see through the proper spectacles; if one does it, one's vision is much enhanced, truer and more detailed.

Cited authors

Natanson Maurice