Methodological perspectivism and scheme-interpretationism in science and elsewhere

Hans Lenk

pp. 383-399

in: Evandro Agazzi, Marco Buzzoni (eds), Epistemologia, Axiomathes 26 (4), 2016.

Abstract

The paper discusses Giere's perspectivism in philosophy of science. Giere is certainly right in judging that, even within perspectives, the strongest possible conclusion is that some model provides a good but never perfect fit to aspects of the world, but its agency-laden "modelism" and realistic instrumentalism should be extended to a comprehensive general perspectivist and "indirect" realistic epistemology and embed it in an anthropology proper of the man as "flexible multiple human being". Scheme-interpretations and specific perspectives are necessary for any cognition in any science—natural and social, but also for everyday conceptions, modeling and practical acting as well as in philosophy and philosophy of science.