Reflections on evidence and criticism in the theory of consciousness

Richard Zaner

pp. 184-207

in: David Carr, Edward Casey (eds), Explorations in phenomenology, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973

Abstract

In his brief addendum to Section 60 of his Formal and Transcendental Logic,¹ Husserl stresses the central place of a theory of evidence, due to whose development alone "has a seriously scientific transcendental philosophy ("critique of reason'²) become possible, as well as, at bottom, a seriously scientific psychology, conceived centrally as the science of the proper essence of the psychic . . .." ³ Only a full theory of evidence, developed on the basis of a thorough criticism of "reason," can properly yield a serious theory and approach to consciousness. He also emphasizes many times the fundamental failure of traditional philosophy to develop a proper and adequate conception of evidence. A brief rehearsal of this, and a systematic placement of the criticism of evidence in the theory of consciousness, will help to show the historical and vital urgency of those issues.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund