The time of the body in Maurice Merleau-Ponty
pp. 85-94
in: Flavia Santoianni (ed), The concept of time in early twentieth-century philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
The starting point of Merleau-Ponty's reflection on time is the notion of functioning intentionality observed in its specific application as a perceptive activity. Through an original treatment of the notion of the perceptual field, the French philosopher describes the activity that, within this field, a particular protagonist carries out, namely one's own body: a particular kind of extension thanks to which it is possible to overcome all those dualistic prejudices that abstractly contrast the subject, or consciousness, with the world and its objects. Instead, in the perceptual field described in the pages of Phenomenology of Perception, the body and the world are "born" in unison. They are reciprocally constituted, to such a point that we can no longer speak of a pure subject or of a disembodied consciousness, separated from objects, but must speak of a corporeal knowledge that is always in relationship with a world that, for its part, finds its objective dimension only by abstracting from that original conferring of meaning attributed to it by bodily action. Now, it is on the basis of this that the analysis of temporality is carried out. The present is a nexus of time that one's own body lives and exists in the perceptual field. More than a representation, time, with its dimensions, is a concrete thickness that is stratified a-thematically in the activity of the body that always inheres in the world. It thus involves not a linear becoming, a summation of instants, but a flow, a continual transition that, from the present, allows access to the past and future which in turn emerge as stratified in the lived time of the present.
