Hume on sense impressions and objects

Marina Frasca-Spada

pp. 13-24

in: Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds), History of philosophy of science, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

This essay is on the nature and roles of sense impressions and objects in Hume's account of perception in the Treatise of Human Nature. I start by considering how Hume introduces sense impressions at the beginning of the Treatise and show that, although he explains the distinction between impressions and ideas on the basis of their different strength and liveliness, the crucial difference between them is in fact that ideas are copies of impressions, while impressions do not, in turn, copy anything. They are what ideas represent, the objects of our thought. But if impressions are non-representative, how can Hume talk about "objects' at all — in fact, what are Humean "objects'? This problem is the subject of the present discussion.