Whewell and the scientists

science and philosophy of science in 19th century Britain

Laura J. Snyder

pp. 81-94

in: Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds), History of philosophy of science, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

What is the relation between science and philosophy of science? Specifically, does it matter whether a philosopher of science knows much about science or is actually engaged in scientific research? William Whewell is an obvious person to consider in relation to this question. Whewell was actively engaged in science in several important ways, some of which have not been previously noted. He conducted research in a number of scientific fields, he devised new terminology for the new discoveries made by other scientists, and he frequently attempted to guide the experimental work of other scientists. Moreover, he was a philosopher of science who explicitly claimed to be inferring his methodological injunctions from an extensive study of the history of scientific work (the full title of his major work on methodology is Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon their History). My recent study of his unpublished letters and notebooks indicates that the intimate relation between science and philosophy was always foremost in Whewell's mind; it was not a theoretical stance adopted after his philosophy was well-developed, as some have suggested. In this paper I will present an examination of the relation between Whewell's involvement in science and the writing of his philosophy of science as a springboard to consider the more general question (which, of course, cannot be answered in a paper of this length). Further insight into the relation between science and philosophy of science will be gained by contrasting Whewell's strong involvement in science with the lack of such involvement in the case of his philosophical antagonist, J.S. Mill.