Automata and inner states for repeated games

Karl Sigmund

Maarten Boerlijst

Martin A. Nowak

pp. 131-139

in: Werner Leinfellner, Eckehart Köhler (eds), Game theory, experience, rationality, Berlin, Springer, 1998

Abstract

The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is often used as a game-theoretic paradigm to analyse the evolution of reciprocity, of mutual aid, and of trade. Conceivably, it can also help in understanding the emergence of inner motivational states, like contrition or outrage, which are essential for fuelling the ethics of communal life. A highly internalised sense of fairness and the readiness for moralistic aggression, the ability to be provoked and the feeling of guilt are important and apparently ubiquituous aspects of human socialisation. Like Ridley (1996) and Frank (1988) we believe that emotional commitment is a major factor in the economics of every-day life.