Commentary on Tuedio's "intentional transaction"

William R. McKenna

pp. 209-216

in: Herbert Otto, James Tuedio (eds), Perspectives on mind, Berlin, Springer, 1988

Abstract

The distinctive aspect of James Tuedio's interpretation of Husserl is the concept of phenomenon "X" within a fourfold noesis-noema-phenomenon-object scheme. It is employed to account for how we can perceive specific objects in the world (the problem of objective reference) and how perceptual knowledge of objects can be corrected or supplemented by further experience (intentional transactions). Most interpreters of Husserl use a threefold scheme, noesis-noema-object, differing with one another about the relationship of the latter two. Some consider the noema to be, or to be part of, the object; while others claim that the noema is not to be identified with the object in any way. In my remarks below I will first explain what I believe to be at stake in these differences and then discuss Tuedio's interpretation within that context. This will require that I give my own interpretation of what Husserl thought the relationship between noema and object to be. I aim to show that what Husserl was trying to do philosophically is not captured by Tuedio's scheme, and that his scheme is problematic even as a conceptual framework for a cognitive psychology.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Tuedio James