Discrimination

pp. 39-51

in: Peter Lucas, Ethics and self-knowledge, Berlin, Springer, 2011

Abstract

Given the fragmentation of the idea of the moral person described in Chapter 2, one may wonder whether the principle of respect for persons can have any relevance to contemporary ethics. I will argue that the apparent irrelevance of the principle is an illusion, stemming from an excessively restrictive view of the phenomena with which ethics must deal. This chapter begins the process of demonstrating the ongoing relevance of the principle, focusing on the phenomenon of discrimination. Discrimination proves to be more than just procedural injustice, since it crucially involves the interpretation of its victims. To be discriminated against is to be treated in a procedurally unjust manner as a member of this or that social group. Discrimination thus proves to be an interpretive moral wrong. The existence and nature of interpretive moral wrongs suggest that moral patiency is a more complex matter than might have been thought, on the basis of traditional accounts of respect for persons.