The causal theory of action

Frederick Stoutland

pp. 271-304

in: Juha Manninen, Raimo Tuomela (eds), Essays on explanation and understanding, Berlin, Springer, 1976

Abstract

The great revival of interest among analytic philosophers in questions about action stems largely from the work of Wittgenstein, who set forth a number of powerful considerations against a causal theory of action. Because of this that theory has been on the defensive, and the sheer bulk of papers criticizing it made it seem in full retreat. The tide has turned recently, and the causal theory is no longer on the defensive. Some of the criticisms have been shown to be mistaken, and others have been turned aside by more subtle developments of the theory. Another reason the theory has regained its status is that its opponents, though they made cogent criticisms, failed to develop a cogent alternative, and the causal theory was given the benefit of the doubt, not so much because it could answer the criticisms but because it was believed that it had to be right, there being no reasonable alternative.

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig