In what sense exactly is Peirce's habit-concept revolutionary?

Erkki Kilpinen

pp. 199-213

in: Myrdene Anderson (ed), Consensus on Peirce's concept of habit, Berlin, Springer, 2016

Abstract

This article argues that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a meaning that differs radically from its meaning in mainstream philosophy, both before and after him. However, Peirce's use is not only different but is from a completely fresh viewpoint, one that turns the received meaning of "habit" upside down, colloquially speaking. Peirce's revolutionarily new meaning, however, is due to considerable development in his philosophy, from nominalism toward realism. In Peirce's final usage, the habit-term does not refer to the routine character, but rather to the process character, of human action. A process, however, can be known only through its instantiations, and in Peirce's final meaning individual "actions", the traditional objects of interest, are instantiations of more comprehensive phenomena, "habits". For Peirce, habitual action is not outside the control of the acting subject's consciousness. The consciousness is present even in so radical sense that the habitual character of action is supposed to correlate positively with its logicality and rationality.

Cited authors

Peirce Charles Sanders