Dicisigns and habits

implicit propositions and habit-taking in Peirce's pragmatism

Frederik Stjernfelt

pp. 241-262

in: Myrdene Anderson (ed), Consensus on Peirce's concept of habit, Berlin, Springer, 2016

Abstract

Peirce's notion of "habit" is famously wide, including also natural dispositions. Another Peircean notion generalized from its normal use is his term for propositions, "Dicisigns". What is the connection between the two? It goes via the pragmatist notion of belief: "A belief in a proposition is a controlled and contented habit of acting in ways that will be productive of desired results only if the proposition is true" (Kaina Stoicheia 1904). This paper charts the important connection between habits, beliefs and Dicisigns.

Cited authors

Peirce Charles Sanders